The Future.

HISTORIANS LOOK FORWARD
A university lives in the tension between what separates and what unites. On the one hand the university has many inner rooms where student cultures lead their more or less conservative lives, teachers hand down tradition and knowledge, and researchers sometimes withdraw to create new knowledge by studying some of the mysteries of reality, without short-sighted demands for patenting, benefiting society, or increasing short-term industrial yield.

On the other hand, the university is in constant dialogue with the surrounding society. If this had not been the case, the university would not have been what it is: one of the most tenacious organizations in world history. The students, the most important of all those who spend their working time at a university (pace top-flight researchers and academic managers), move in large groups in and out through the university gates and therefore represent a constant interaction. The knowledge generated at universities is used in a wide range of contexts: whether we look at industry or the public sector, we see that university-related research often pops up. A prosopography of all the Swedish university professors in the last two hundred years or so would include a multitude of university researchers who have assumed the role of experts in many spheres of society. And the influence also runs in the opposite direction. Processes of political change, industrially impelled processes of technological modernization, international politics, and fluctuating military situations create social, technological, and economic forces that affect scholarship inside the universities, and university researchers are not infrequently adroit at using these as resources for their projects. The idea of the academy as an ivory tower is a historical myth. And university history as a research field therefore cannot confine itself solely to studying changes within the academy, but should also comprise the university’s interaction with the surrounding world.

It is towards this part of university history, the side oriented towards society, that we now direct our gaze.

In 1968 a Lund historian, recently appointed as professor, published an article that criticized the direction of history at Swedish universities. Almost all historical research had once been suitable for practical application, its results were in demand and used by politicians and other people who needed to know something about how society ought to be governed. But that time was long gone: historians at universities in 1968 were above all geared to basic research. Their results were judged by internal disciplinary criteria, not by their relevance or usefulness in society. The subject was too isolated. History ought instead to come closer to the social sciences and intensify its interaction with the “customers”, the author argued. Historians should be more willing to risk making generalizations. Given human nature and the patterns, if not regularities, that could be detected in
historical development, the findings of historians can be useful for politicians and for the institutions in society that deal with forecasting and planning. Only in this way, the author seemed to think, could history break out of its isolation to occupy a larger place in research policy at a time when various social sciences were attracting large numbers of students, research grants, and political contacts.

The author of the article was Birgitta Odén. She debated the direction of the subject in central and visible arenas such as the journals Historisk tidskrift and Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, but also agitated for a practical implementation of this vision of research that would be more oriented to society, more necessary and more in demand, in the discipline of history at her own university: Lund. One of the areas where Odén wanted to see a change in research policy was future studies or futurology, a field that captured the interest of many people at the end of the long 1960s. What follows is a case study of how university researchers can act in the role of creators of knowledge that is considered relevant and in demand in society, and how this has repercussions both inside and outside the academy. It is also a case study of the research-policy positions adopted in the humanities, specifically in the subject of history, at a time when social scientists were advancing and claiming more space with assignments as public experts, and how some Lund historians related to this. It is a history of how researchers have interacted with the political system. It is a history of the futurologists at Lund University in the 1970s. But before we get there, a few words to give a framework to their activity.

Choosing the future

One can talk about the emergence of a more general critique of development at the end of the sixties and the start of the seventies. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) and the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (1972), with their many successors, drew attention to the environmental problems associated with Western development and its fixation on technology. If Paul Ehrlich was right, The Population Bomb would lead to an overcrowded earth, mass famine, and serious social problems on a global scale. Young people in various countercultures with alternative lifestyles questioned the norms for social interaction. All this, and much besides, makes up the backdrop against which futurology emerged. Perhaps futurology can be seen as a way to cope with and comprehend a world in change, an attempt to answer the question of where the world was headed, an effort to understand societal change at least semi-rationally and semi-scientifically.

The ideas behind the increasing popularity of futurology in the second half of the 1960s can be found in the critique of development described above. Another
factor was the technologies for planning major military projects that had been developed in the USA at least since the Second World War, under designations such as operations analysis and systems analysis. Since the weapon technologies of the Cold War represented something totally new, historical experience from earlier wars was of little help, and therefore futurology was enlisted in an attempt to understand what a thermonuclear war could mean. Through organizations like the RAND Corporation, these technologies then came into use in matters such as city planning, and soon futurology was a common activity in civil and private contexts. The USA was an important arena for futurology, but it also interested researchers in many other countries. In the second half of the 1960s futurology rapidly became a growing branch of applied social science, with star names like Daniel Bell and Herman Kahn, and institutional frameworks such as the Commission on the Year 2000, established in 1965 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the RAND Corporation, and the Hudson Institute, along with various companies. The field dealt with issues such as: a coming post-industrial society where we work less and have more leisure time; communication technology; lifestyle matters (is there increasing hedonism in the body politic?); the emergence of non-European economic great powers (often exemplified by Japan); and of course issues concerning the environment and resources. Organizations were created, periodicals arose, futurological world congresses were convened (the first in Oslo in 1967). A society in rapid change was trying, with the aid of futurology, to understand the forces causing change, and in certain cases to steer development towards desired goals.

In Sweden futurology was introduced in three different contexts above all. The first was military, especially the National Defence Research Institute (Försvarets forskningsanstalt, FOA), which began operations analysis and systems analysis early after the Second World War. This could concern mathematically optimizing and simulating types of armour and the procurement of complex new arms systems; mathematics was used for decision support. From the end of the 1950s military operations analysis grew in importance, the number of staff working with operations analysis rose sharply, and a special department was set up, The Planning Bureau (FOA P), described as a central spider in the Swedish military web. This means that, when work in futurology got going in other parts of society around 1970, there was already relatively large-scale indigenous activity in futurology attached to FOA.

Secondly, business was active. “Skandia group invests in futurology”, an article in the business magazine Veckans Affärer reported in 1969. They were seeking a holistic perspective:
Swedish companies are investing more and more in totally open futurology – and no longer proceeding from the company, but compiling a complete picture of the whole development of society and then placing the company somewhere in the overall picture from that viewpoint.\textsuperscript{619}

The article highlights the Skandia group with its director Pehr G. Gyllenhammar as a pioneer, “the company in Sweden that has gone furthest of all in systematically working to plan the future.” Other companies busy with this, according to the article, were Astra, PLM, Sandvikens Jernverk, and SCA. The topic appeared in several issues of \textit{Veckans Affärer} in the spring and the summer of the moon landing in 1969, and in what developed into a series of articles about futurology, readers of the newspaper could meet the prince of futurology, Herman Kahn, who had been flown over to Stockholm.\textsuperscript{610}

In certain cases the investment in futurology appears to have been an internal concern for these companies, intended to provide information to the management on which to base decisions; in other cases it can be better understood as part of the companies’ marketing in a time when Swedish business wanted to show that it was keeping pace with a world in change. For a few years futurology was a hot topic. The company PLM, for instance, held a seminar on the future in Malmö. In June 1970 international figureheads such as Daniel Bell, Herman Kahn, Peter Drucker, and Ota Šik (together with Swedes including Torgny Segerstedt and Tore Browaldh gathered in Malmö to discuss the post-industrial society that was seen to be coming, the corporate management of the future, coming changes in lifestyle, computerization and automation, and much besides. \textit{Sydsvenska Dagbladet} had continuous reports, and everything was later published in book form.\textsuperscript{641} Private industry, during a few years at the end of the 1960s, thus became a new organizational context for futurology.

Although various companies pursued futurology on their own, the most important venture was the business-related effort by the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien, IVA), which set up a committee in 1967 to define the concept of futurology, to survey ongoing activities, and to discuss the need for further measures.\textsuperscript{642} The IVA committee gathered academics – the mathematician Göran Borg (Royal Institute of Technology), the sociologist Gösta Carlsson (Lund University), and representatives of business and associated organizations: the National Board for Technical Development, the Skandia group, Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson, the Swedish Association of the Mechanical, Electrical, and Electronic Engineering Industries, Norrbottens Järnverk AB, the Swedish Association of Engineers and Architects. The National
Defence Research Institute was also attached, entrusted with the task of carrying out a number of investigations.

The committee arrived at the conclusion “that in civil service departments, companies, and organizations there is a considerable interest in systematic futurology and that most of those asked felt a need for a central Swedish body for the subject”. They went on to outline what the structure and duties of such a body should be. Briefly, it may be said that the suggestion was to establish a Swedish institute of futurology, designed in a similar way to the sectorial research institutes that had grown up in large numbers during the twentieth century, especially in the post-war years; these were semi-state-owned and performed research on everything from conservation technology to concrete.

Everything thus appeared to be in place for the creation of a Swedish institute of futurology. But the proposal was criticized. Lars Ingelstam, a mathematician at the Royal Institute of Technology, pointed out in an article in Aftonbladet in 1969 that the IVA study had not sufficiently considered that the state and private industry differed in their perceptions of futurology and the planning and governing effect on societal development that such studies could have. According to Ingelstam, a government, at least a social democratic one, had an “interest in much more active futurology, geared to governance, than private industry has”. The IVA proposal for a sectorial research institute was wrong because it gave too much power to private industry to steer the work of the institute. Instead an institute of this kind should be entirely run by the state. Futurology was too important to admit special industrial interests; it was a way to pursue politics, Ingelstam argued, and therefore industry should not have as big a say as in the IVA proposal.

It was not unusual for futurology to be perceived as a way to intervene in the development of society and thus pursue politics by proxy. This opinion is articulated even more forcefully in an article by Jan Annerstedt and Lars Dencik from 1971. They view futurology as having grown since the middle of the 1960s as a hardboiled discipline for hardboiled men equipped with an indefatigable head for figures, technological schooling, computers, and Anglo-cynical jargon; a Herman Kahn, an Anthony Wiener, a Daniel Bell, and an Eskil Block have invaded the technocratic-bureaucratic-political debate.

The function of futurology, according to Annerstedt and Dencik, “is in part to give the ruling elites a shared frame of reference […] an instrument for the governing elite” that conceals class antagonisms and leads towards a growing corporative
The report had been delivered by IVA, “one of industry’s prime pressure bodies in research matters” which “coordinated the interest of the big companies in futurology.”

Ingelstam, Annerstedt, and Dencik were not isolated voices; their opinions were heard all the way into the government, which set up a work group chaired by Alva Myrdal. It was to draw up the guidelines for the third context where future studies found a place in Sweden in the years around 1970: state-financed and organized futurology. IVA’s interest in futurology did not cease; the organization was behind a “Futurology Association” which arranged study groups and seminars and published books. On the academic side there were courses for doctoral students in industrially related subjects such as business administration and technology, and later on IVA pursued futurology under the designation Technological Foresight (Teknisk framsyn). But IVA, industry, and indeed FOA as well were decentralised through the actions of the social democratic government.

The work of the Myrdal group yielded a report entitled “Choosing the Future.” It was received along predictable lines. The social democratic Aftonbladet welcomed it, while several liberal newspapers criticized what they saw as a concentration of futurology with far too close a link to the government offices and called
instead for a futurology that was more independent of political ties. Responses arrived from some 130 authorities and organizations, most of them positive to the report. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) regarded futurology as a means to control society, while the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) warned against overestimating the use of futurology as an instrument for planning and control. More technical objections came, for example, from IVA, which criticized what it saw as an excessively broad definition of futurology, which included both direct measures of public planning and pure research activities. FOA, which had actually worked with futurology, stated both in its first comment and then in a more detailed report that it disapproved of this more open and excessively broad definition of futurology. Despite the criticism, when the report was considered by the drafting committee on research in September 1972 it was for the most part favourably received. A Secretariat for Futurology was established and attached to the Cabinet Office on 1 February 1973.

Let us dwell a little on the use of terms: what name was given to this swiftly growing field, so cherished by everyone from corporations to state administration, by people as different as Alva Myrdal and a young business lion like Pehr G. Gyllenhammar? The choice of term reveals a positioning in both epistemology and research policy.

In the second half of the 1960s people in Sweden spoke of “future studies” (framtidsstudier) or “future research” (framtidsforskning), but rarely used the word futurologi. Companies claimed that they pursued “future studies”, while left-wing critics spoke of “future research”. Sometimes it was the other way around, with the industrial circle talking of “future research”. Through time, however, the term “future studies” dominated in Swedish. Why?

In the introduction to “Choosing the Future” there is a discussion of terms:

Internationally the terms future research, futurology and Futurologie are fairly general, without any specific meaning being ascribed to them. The word framtidsforskning has been launched and used in Sweden, but good reasons have also been put forward as to why one should prefer a less pretentious designation, e.g. framtidsstudier. An important reason is that one must include in the field of future studies a whole range of activities that are the application and development of known methods rather than the quest for new knowledge, another is that it is unjustified to use words loaded with such prestige as “research” or “science” to conceal uncertainty, methodological unclarity, and the inevitable subjectivity of statements made. One can also discern a risk that the language used strengthens a
tendency to regard futurology as a concern chiefly for specialists (researchers, planners) and thus undermine the democratic and political element. Finally, statements about the future naturally pose different epistemological problems from, say, empirical or logical statements. 649

The question of the scientific status of futurology and the associated choice of designation would also be raised elsewhere, together with the research-policy specification that the activity ought not to be primarily a concern for specialists. The latter can be seen, for instance, in the introduction to a policy statement on one of the research projects run under the auspices of the Secretariat for Futurology, which stresses that by

working in openness and delivering material to the public debate – to political parties, social movements, adult education associations, mass media, and directly to interested people – futurology can contribute to a democratic foundation for planning and decision making and counteract tendencies to governance by experts or elites. 660

In *Sverige i världen – tankar om framtiden* ("Sweden in the World – Thoughts about the Future"), the final report from the same project, the authors reflect on the scientific status of futurology. Verification, falsification, and testing the claims of futurology can hardly be done until we know what has actually happened. Futurology also has the potential to affect people’s actions — “That is not infrequently the purpose,” the report notes with a hint at the social-planning vein in futurology – and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy by getting people to act in the indicated direction, so that a statement about the future can scarcely be called knowledge. And the report says:

Futurology cannot be properly said to mean that we have knowledge about the future, partly for the reasons stated. But this must not obscure the fact that in certain cases we actually draw conclusions about the past based on source material that can be far more meagre than the data on which we base statements about the future.

The project group makes no claim to be strictly scientific. Nor is it a coincidence that the term “future studies” is preferred to “future research”, which sounds more pretentious in Swedish. This does not mean, however, that all claims to scientificness have been abandoned. It is fully possible to apply scientific methodology to the material that serves as a basis for
the study. It even seems like a demand that this should be done because these methods have been worked out and successfully tested on similar material in social research. The data for the study must thus be analysed just as stringently as in other subjects. The statements that are made about the future cannot be tested on empirical material, but criteria such as theoretical consistency, relevance to the problem field, validity, and the requirement of a sufficient basis for hypotheses both can and must be used in futurology. In this sense, futurology can also claim to be scientific.  

This terminological discussion – the choice of a designation simultaneously signalling a less cocksure epistemological stance (yet still with some claim to be scientific) and rejecting a non-democratic and expert-dominated ivory-tower position for future studies – would later leave its mark on the Swedish way of doing research about the future.

A slight shift can perhaps be noted from 1972 to 1978, from the emphasis in the Myrdal inquiry on “uncertainty, methodological unclarity, and inevitable subjectivity” to the statement by the Lund research group that “criteria such as theoretical consistency, relevance to the problem field, validity, and the requirement of a sufficient basis for hypotheses both can and must be used in futurology.” This could be a sign of the time, underlining the argument of Johan Asplund, who discussed the terminological issue in the introduction to his book about futurology from 1979. After highlighting in block quotations the rejection of the term “future research” in the Myrdal inquiry and the reasons for this, Asplund says that he has chosen in his book to vary the terms, making no distinction between futurology, future research, and future studies. His reasons are partly practical – Swedish framtidstudier in its inflected and compounded forms can be clumsy, he notes – but above all it is a signal about research policy and theory of science: “the expression ‘future studies’ is on the way to acquiring precisely the semantic nuances that the authors of the proposal [the Myrdal inquiry] sought to avoid.” Asplund thought that futurology was becoming such a prestige-ridden science and a concern mainly for specialists, researchers, and planners, exactly what people wanted to avoid in 1970 when they carved out a niche that differed as regards research policy and epistemology from the FOA-based futurology.

It is now time to look at the Lund historians who worked with futurology. These are Birgitta Odén, who was a member of the working group that produced the report leading to the Secretariat for Futurology, and a research group led by Sven Tägil, which ran one of the major projects financed by the Secretariat for Futurology in the 1970s.
The utility of history

A number of experts gathered around Alva Myrdal to inquire into the need for and implementation of futurology in Sweden. One of these experts was Birgitta Odén, professor of history at Lund University since 1965. Odén could be said to belong to the Stockholm-oriented faction of Lund’s professors, collaborating in various ways with various actors outside the university at national level. For example, she had been on the drafting committee on research since February 1969 (when she succeeded Erik Lönroth as the historian in this assembly). Moreover, Birgitta Odén had a basic outlook on the subject of history which leaned towards the social sciences, and she liked to reflect on the utility of historical scholarship and its relevance to society. Her ideal was scarcely idiographic pedantry. In essays on “Clio between Chairs” and “The Place of History in Social Research” she had argued for a rapprochement between history and the social sciences.

The social scientists had long since taken the lead in relevance to society and the potential of university-based scholarship to tackle problem complexes formulated outside scholarship, something that was in demand in the years around 1968. Odén was one among several historians who tried to reposition history in order to regain lost territory, lost resources, lost societal relevance. One of these resources, of course, was the students; there was a great risk that the historians’ seminar room would be drained of students if they chose instead to study subjects that they perceived as more relevant to society. Odén viewed her own times as an age when politicians, when making decisions, were increasingly “dependent on scientific information for their choice of alternative actions”, and it was therefore obvious that the politicians’ interest in targeted research was growing. Research geared to specific problem fields thus became more important – for society – and therefore the question of priorities appeared on the agenda. And in these prioritizations, the “customers” would naturally tend to evaluate a university subject with reference to its usefulness. The control of research went together with the control of societal development. Internal disciplinary criteria and the intrinsic value of historical knowledge were the other side of the coin. There are many examples, according to Odén, from medical and scientific research in which basic research is crucial for targeted research, and vice versa. Generally speaking, both are needed: “The maximum yield – from the politicians’ point of view – comes from a good balance between basic research and applied research.”

After this general analysis of basic research and targeted research, Odén turns her gaze towards the subject of history at Swedish universities. A long time ago virtually all historical research was geared to specific goals and used by politicians,
but this had changed because of methodological development within the subject and political development outside the subject. History had become basic research; research problems were selected and assessed on intradisciplinary criteria. But it need not be like this, as the state could very well support both basic research and applied historical research. But what would this usefulness entail for the subject of history? Odén envisages three main categories. One is “culture consumption”, popular scholarship on a scientific foundation for a general public with an interest in history. This must be of an up-to-date kind:

It is important in terms of social psychology that what is offered is scientifically correct and not tainted by the values of older generations. A typical feature of residual values is seen in the national assessment scales which for a long time distorted the history that was written in non-scholarly language.⁶⁶⁹
Another category consists of scholars in other disciplines where historical research may be in demand. Yet another category is made up of politicians who need knowledge about trends or phenomena in society and culture which are repeated. In this, university historians have more or less allowed a walkover: historical research findings are hardly in demand among politicians any longer; instead it is statisticians, political economists, political scientists, psychologists, geographers, and sociologists who have the ear of public planners and politicians. The reason is that historians usually do research on individualized topics, and their results do not provide any foundation for discussing different options. It could very well be otherwise: if one understands “how strongly current politics can be influenced by prevailing opinions about past events” one can understand the importance of historical knowledge in the political process.

**Preliminary work in Lund on “Choosing the Future”**

Birgitta Odén was thus well equipped to belong to the group of experts who were to draw up the guidelines for futurology, a field in which social scientists and humanists together would help to shape society by choosing the future. In her main contribution to the Myrdal working group, the preliminary study entitled (in Swedish) “Planning, Value Structure, and Democratic Participation: An Attempt at an Interdisciplinary Description of the Problem” (“this report which my husband sarcastically called ‘Birgitta’s red hell’”) Odén reflected on the contribution of historians to the future and the present. Looking back later, Odén wrote: “As the only humanist in the futurological group, it fell to my lot to reflect on the role of evaluations in the societal processes which would bring us into the future society that would establish the framework for ‘the good life’, which was the aim of futurology.” Futurology was viewed as something that could create the framework for a certain kind of society; there was an element of societal steering in futurology, according to Odén.

Given this steering effect of futurology, it is important who does future studies, in what political contexts and on what ideological premises. In a research survey at the beginning of the report Odén examines how value issues have been tackled by different branches of international futurology. She draws up a futurological taxonomy and looks at the way value issues are treated in technological, ecological, and social-scientific/humanistic futurology, at futurological conferences, and in Swedish futurology. In the section about technological futurology, Birgitta Odén notes that work with technological forecasts by the OECD and others was an important part of futurological studies and that evaluation issues there had been
subordinate at first, but that they have recently been given more room. The interest in values was growing among futurologists working in technology. She explicitly mentions Jantsch, who claims that the industrial sector

has functioned as an innovation factor for a number of important changes in evaluation – the examples he names are internationalism and interdisciplinarity – and from this he concludes that technology can deliver positive contributions to the problem of values. Ultimately the newly aroused interest that technological futurology has shown in value problems sometimes leads to an explicit claim that industry should figure as a planner in society as well.673

Industry as an active participant in changes in evaluation? Private industry as a planning body for societal development? No thank you, Odén replies, that would be against “basic democratic principles” and it must be closely watched and countered. Here we see clearly how the futurology that was formed around the political establishment, especially social democracy, reacted to what was seen as excessive influence from private industry on vital changes in society that ought to be the domain of politics alone. It was thought, and feared, that industry could use futurology to pursue politics. And that was perhaps not a wholly unfounded fear, in view of the high degree of futurological activity that had developed in industry and its associated organizations such as IVA in the years after 1965.

But it was not only the use of futurology by private industry to intervene in societal development that Odén warned and acted against. She also drew the line against a kind of public expert team of natural scientists. It was important that they should not be allowed to take over issues that were actually political, like the debaters who cited environmental problems to argue that biologists and other scientific experts should have a special position in politics. This theme was on the agenda particularly after the Club of Rome’s *Limits to Growth*, J. W. Forrester’s works, and, in Sweden, books by Georg Borgström, Gösta Ehrensvärd, and Kerstin and Hannes Alfvén.674

In this special report there are also echoes of the interdisciplinary debate about the goals and methods of history, a debate in which Odén, as we saw above, had been active for several years. New historical knowledge can have an intrinsic value. It can also be assessed using extradisciplinary criteria: “the products of historical research should be capable of being adapted to the needs of public planning”, a justification for historical research “that is not accepted within the profession.”675 Art for art’s sake, then, seemed to reign supreme among Odén’s
fellow historians; they resisted the utilitarian humanistic research that she herself pleaded for.

But if Odén did not find so many nomothetically inclined utilitarian colleagues in the university departments of history, her ideas found it all the more easy to gain a foothold in the circles behind the Secretariat for Futurology. Once this had been established, a good share of its resources was allocated to a project led by historians and located at Lund University. Odén had successfully carved a research-policy niche where several historians could work from now on.

Sweden in the world

But how did people go about doing futurology in an academic context? What methods were used, how was the research organized, what effect did futurology have inside and outside the university? These are some of the questions we must consider as we now look more closely at the project.

One of the first tasks of the Secretariat for Futurology was to launch four major projects. The Swedish Parliament had initially granted four million kronor to futurology. Half of this went to financing three projects, while the fourth project, “Energy and Society”, received funding direct from Parliament.676 The projects were started in 1974–1975 with the intention of “giving politicians and other decision makers a better foundation for decisions” and “contributing to increased awareness of the future in society”.677 The four projects were productive, generating a total of over sixty reports and half a dozen books, thus exceeding the expectations of the Secretariat. The projects assembled university researchers and experts from various academic disciplines, and they can be seen as an expression of the academic research of the 1970s with its orientation to society and its focus on relevance. “The autonomy and responsibility of the project groups should not rule out close and informal contacts with, among others, the Secretariat for Futurology and members of the ministerial reference group”, as was noted in an early report describing the design of the projects.678 The projects tackled four cross-sector fields which were deemed important for public planning. It was thought that many problems of long-term significance span several different sectors of society, but the customary organization of planning and decisions was often sectorially structured. Nor was the universities’ form of organization optimal for the highly complex problem fields in long-term planning and societal analysis: “In relation to the universities and research institutions, futurology also means that existing boundaries – between subjects, faculties, research councils, etc. – must be broken down.”679 Besides “Energy and Society”, the projects were “Working Life in the
Future”, “Resources and Raw Materials”, and “Sweden’s International Circumstances”. We shall now turn our attention towards the latter.

The project was located at Lund University and led by the historian Sven Tägil, who had gained his doctorate with a source-critical dissertation about Valdemar Atterdag, a medieval king of Denmark, but he had moved towards Odén’s ideal of a historian, doing research of relevance to the present day, more interested in theory, and closer to the social sciences. The project had been designed within the Secretariat for Futurology and in consultation with the ministerial reference group. Several of the comments received in response to the report “Choosing the Future” had expressed a wish for an analysis of how Sweden related to international changes over a longer temporal perspective. The project was interdisciplinary but with a large number of historians. Besides Tägil there were three other researchers from the Department of History at Lund University: Bo Huldt, Rune Johansson, and Lars Niléhn. Then there were two social scientists, Thomas Hörberg of the Department of Political Science, Lund, and Svante Iger, Department of Political Economy, Stockholm University and the Institute of International Affairs. Other researchers were attached to the project for varying lengths of time, such as the meteorologist Henning Rodhe, the historian Göran Andolf, and the literary scholar Richard McKinney.

The project was well financed by the standards of the day, with plenty of money allocated to cover the researchers’ salaries, secretarial resources, travel expenses, and the like. There were relatively close contacts with the Secretariat and also with the reference group consisting of representatives of different government departments attached to the project. The reference group included several high-profile people, such as Inga-Britt Ahlenius, Department of Trade, and from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Hans Blix, Inga Thorsson, and Sverker Åström.

At Lund University there were also other researchers and departments connected to futurology, and Sven Tägil and his colleagues collaborated with some of these at times. A picture emerges of Lund University as a place where futurology took up a position among other research fields, not infrequently unorthodox in its attitude to subject traditions. Part of the renewal of the university’s research and education came at a time when new subject combinations and interdisciplinary perspective were permitted to grow. The sociologist and peace researcher Håkan Wiberg gained his doctorate in 1977 with a dissertation on problems of peace and conflict from a future perspective, written in a project led by Johan Galtung. In 1966 a department of peace and conflict studies was established in the Faculty of Social Sciences, centred on Wiberg. Tägil’s interest in the role of technology in societal development gave what one can perhaps call an affinity with Stevan
Dedijer, who at the end of the 1960s initiated vigorous activity in areas such as research policy and analyses of the role of technology and science in society, under the designation the Research Policy Programme, later the Research Policy Institute. 684

Tägil’s project group was careful to stress that they were not trying to create knowledge about the future. Statements about the future obviously could not be empirically tested. They nevertheless emphasized that criteria such as theoretical consistency, relevance to the problem field, and the requirement of sufficient data for hypotheses were essential components in pursuing futurology. No unbridled opinions, but “compiling and testing thoughts and alternatives, yet with formal demands borrowed from the world of science.” 685 “A future study is neither an inquiry not a research project, but is closely akin to both.” 686 Their work was mainly aimed at those who had justified worries about the future but simultaneously were prepared to do something about this future. The ambition was not to provide a key to understanding a single future development, but rather to stimulate debate

In the mid 1970s the historian Sven Tägil was commissioned by the Secretariat for Futurology to lead a project about how Sweden related to long-term international changes. Picture from 1998.
and thinking about future issues. They wanted to help to generate awareness of the future, “to contribute to deeper democracy by expanding understanding of long-term problems”, and they believed they were counteracting contemporary tendencies to “government by experts or elites” by interacting with the surrounding society.

The whole of Swedish society was a potential recipient of the findings of the university-based project, and this broad relevance had, if anything, been strengthened by the increasing international awareness among the general public in the post-war years, as claimed in the policy statement issued when the project started. Presumably it was considered particularly important to stress this interactive side of futurology; a few years earlier Dencik and Annerstedt, as we saw above, had associated futurology with the creation of tools for the governing elites, and they were scarcely alone in seeing the technocratic connotations of futurology. While this openness to the surrounding society in the form of social movements, adult education associations, mass media, and also direct address to interested individuals, was a premise for the project, there was also an endeavour to interact with the political system. Tägil and his colleagues positioned futurology as, in their words, a bridge between research and politics. Much other interaction between research or other expertise and the political actors was sectorially organized, and this opened a possibility for futurology to contribute something qualitatively new in the relationship between experts and politics: to ensure that decision makers at different levels were confronted with hitherto untested alternatives.

The field studied by the project was Sweden’s interaction with the rest of the world in long-term perspective (which was defined in round numbers as the time up to the year 2000). What chance did Sweden have to exert influence at an international level, how did the outside world affect Sweden’s capacity for national action, and how might this link between Sweden and the world change in the light of various development trends in international politics? The questions were dealt with in a publication from spring 1978, the final report of the project group entitled “Sweden in the World – Thoughts about the Future”. Here four alternative scenarios were outlined for development in the world. Four terms had been used as sorting instruments: conflict and cooperation, internationalization and de-internationalization. Each scenario had been worked on by one of the project’s researchers, based on the work done during the project, and treated in a large number of separate reports.

In his contribution the economist Svante Iger described a global development characterized by internationalization and cooperation. He allowed economic factors to be the primary motive force in a development where the rich world
continued to be rich and based on capitalism – he did not envisage any expansion of communism. The economically difficult years in the 1970s, with increasing inflation and unemployment and falling growth in Western countries, had led to increased protectionism and the introduction of various trade barriers. In the relatively optimistic world that Iger saw before him, protectionism would be reduced, simply because the USA, the European Community, and Japan had so much to gain from reducing impediments to trade. Iger saw the possibility that a new international order would arise, based on capitalism and cooperation. This presupposed a coordination of economic policies between the USA, the EC countries, and Japan. The Third World occupied some space in Iger’s future scenario; the developing countries would not be able to challenge capitalism. A common policy on the part of the rich world vis-à-vis the Third World was viewed as necessary for the global structural transformation that Iger spoke of, building on increased industrialization in poor countries. He saw a future where the USA’s hegemony continued to increase, Western Europe and Japan remained relatively independent in relation to the USA, and the EC continued its economic integration. Western economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China was expected to grow in the years up to 2000. Cooperation on technological development between different countries could have the effect that even smaller countries would renew their industry; examples cited by Iger were solar energy or ocean technology to exploit the resources on the sea bed.

The challenge for Sweden was to bring the country’s industry up to date. Factors indicating that Sweden would be able to get through the structural crisis and achieve competitive and more high-tech industrial production were the well-educated workforce and the advanced technological knowledge. Iger foresaw a Sweden that had developed towards what he called “plan capitalism”, characterized by expansion of the public sector, increased “democratization” through the introduction of wage-earners’ investment funds and greater scope for the state to coordinate economic policy through central planning. The increasing importance of the state would lead to growing power for bureaucrats and experts; in political terms Iger saw here a possible weakening of parliamentarism and “establishment of a ‘permanent’ centre government representing the vast majority of the people.”

In an appendix to Iger’s chapter an alternative future scenario was presented, elaborated by Iger together with the meteorologist Henning Rodhe. Here the forces driving world development are above all linked to natural resources. Changes in climate due to the use of fossil fuels, bad agricultural policy in the Third World, parasite attacks, and other causes would together lead to a global food disaster.
Citizens in the developed countries would be drawn to extra-parliamentary alternative movements and the struggle against nuclear power, voicing demands for radical changes to society. The rich world would work jointly for international cooperation on food and increased regulation of the work of the evil multinational food corporation in developing countries. As the icing on the cake, the use of fossil fuels would cease and renewable sources of energy would be developed.

The historian Bo Huldt built a scenario based on the research field of international politics. Two main conflict dimensions were discussed: east–west and north–south. In Huldt’s sketch there is first a harmonious relationship in the rich world, east and west cooperate, disarm, and enjoy peace and economic growth. A turning point, “which is envisaged as coming around 1990, can be linked to isolated dramatic events but is seen as a result of development over a longer time”, destroys the harmony that characterized the 1980s. Energy crises, disturbances in world trade, social unrest set their stamp on politics. East and West Germany gravitate towards each other, whereupon the Soviet Union is alarmed by tendencies to dissolution in Eastern Europe and German revanchism; the Soviet leaders plan reactions to what they perceive as the threat of being encircled. Countries in the First World find it increasingly difficult to obtain cheap raw materials in the south, partly because of a guerrilla war in South Africa and other trouble spots. Europe reverses the disarmament policy of the 1980s, the Cold War becomes steadily colder, but the trend of events comes to a stop before a major war breaks out between East and West.

A different scenario involves about a conflict between North and South. The developing countries make common cause against the rich world. Heavy re-armament in the Third World, encouraged, of course, by Saab, Bofors, and their colleagues and competitors, makes the South more powerful. The potential of the North to intervene in developing countries is reduced. Nuclear proliferation adds to the shift of balance, and in the 1980s countries like Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons of their own. In addition there is the possibility that the poor countries “may be tempted to resort to various forms of guerrilla war, terrorism, support for extra-parliamentary opposition, and so on in the First World in order to gain acceptance for special demands through systematic ‘blackmail’.”

Like Iger and Rodhe, Huldt emphasizes that ecological factors and shortage of natural resources can affect relations between North and South. Increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere can cause shifts in climate zones, with negative effects on agriculture in the Third World, whose policies towards the West become more hostile since they think that the West is mainly to blame. The poor countries perhaps do not even experience rudimentary industrialization. Resource crises can
very well have serious consequences. In the 1980s various regional power centres, blocs, and alliances arise in the Third World. Around 1990 the developing countries become increasingly offensive in their critique of and resistance to the North. A drastic escalation cannot be ruled out. The South risks defeat, but the cost to the North is high. “A protracted conflict at a low level ought to be an alternative with better prospects of success for the South”, rather than high-intensity warfare. The North loses its leading position when the South, headed by India and/or China, attacks in a series of global convulsions around 2000. Huldt, however, allows for the possibility that the industrial countries, by virtue of the superior technology, crush the uprising and retain their dominance.

Sweden’s development since 1945 is described by Huldt as three golden decades: stability, economic development, prosperity, freedom of action in domestic and foreign policy. The dramatic changes he outlines in international relations affect Sweden. Our northern position perhaps saves us from direct nuclear attacks from the South, but there is a greater risk of terror actions. Trade war and blockades become very serious for our highly industrialized welfare state. Even if we could repeat the feat we managed in the first two world wars and stay out of the third, we will have major problems because the economic dependencies that link us to global phenomena today are so much greater. A much more complex Swedish society than the relatively homogeneous country that escaped two previous world wars means a weakening of national identity and cohesion, Huldt writes. In foreign policy Sweden’s role as a bridge builder will presumably have to be abandoned; in a harsher international climate the country will be forced to tone down its profile as “the world’s conscience” in favour of more traditional diplomatic interaction.

In the study by the political scientist Thomas Hörberg, the world is drifting towards conflict and de-internationalization, a situation in which the increase in international connections is interrupted and individual states become more important as actors. Hörberg examines security policy and sees tendencies in the near future towards a break-up of the blocs around the two superpowers. NATO cooperation ceases to work as a cohesive force when economic antagonism between the USA and Western Europe escalates; the desire of each nation to protect its own economy leads to trade restrictions and even trade war. In the Eastern bloc there is a centrifugal forced caused by the way the communist world movement develops; successes for communist parties in Western European countries result in a challenge to the Soviet dominance in the Eastern alliance, and countries can be envisaged as leaving the Eastern bloc to orient themselves towards the West. Together with increased elements of state regulation in the Western economies,
these processes have the effect that differences between the capitalist and the socialist systems become increasingly blurred.

Methods of conflict and ways of creating power bases have changed. Weapons of mass destruction spread to more and more countries, and military power is also supplemented with control over natural resources and food production. Ultimately the two superpowers are degraded to become two among a set of great powers, each of them dominating one region in the world. A number of small states gather around these great powers. The palette of actors also includes non-state international organizations which play some part, in the same way as transnational corporations. Like Huldt, Hörberg foresees how terror groups, liberation fronts, and separatist movements become significant, and perhaps terrorism will even “to some extent replace war as the most serious form of conflict between states.” Moreover, Hörberg discusses, as do several others in the project, the conflicts that can be caused by climate change, ozone holes, and other ecological forces. Altogether this leads to a scenario in which population pressure and production disturbances lead to famine. China wages war on the Soviet Union for Siberia with its rich raw materials. The Warsaw Pact disintegrates, as does NATO. A great many civil wars and local wars rage all over the world. In the absence of NATO the individual EC countries invest more in rearming themselves. Countries like the UK, France, and Spain have major problems with regional liberation movements. West Germany moves towards its goal – reunification – by supporting anti-Russian movements in the East economically and militarily. Although Hörberg is unwilling to rule out a direct Swedish attachment to the EC or the Eastern bloc, he observes that an independent position between the blocs agrees best with Swedish tradition. Moreover, we establish cooperation with transnational companies and bilaterally with Third World countries and develop Nordic cooperation.

As in other contributions to the project, the historian Rune Johansson discusses ecological factors: climate changes as a consequence of the use of fossil fuels, nuclear power, and the importance of switching to renewable sources of energy. In addition he focuses on values, patterns of culture, and lifestyles. Consumption and the question of what gives social status can be driving forces in development, as can the stress of the rat race and the risk that people’s sense of identity gets lost in a modern mass-media society with workplaces where individuals are largely replaceable. Ethnic and national affiliation may still perhaps have a part to play, despite internationalization; Johansson sees a development where nationality will continue to exert an important influence in political development in the coming decades. Reactions to internationalization lead to de-internationalization. Industries moving their operations from West to East or South can cause unemployment, which
in turn can lead to class antagonisms or expressions of nationalism. In developing countries, nationalism is impelled by the sense of national identification that is aroused in connection with liberation from colonial powers.

In Johansson’s scenario the global role of the USA gradually shrinks. Its engagement in Europe, Africa, and East Asia is reduced. The Soviet Union runs into domestic problems as citizens demand higher living standards. East European countries want greater independence, ethnic problems can arise in the East and we see a weakening of the Warsaw Pact. Japan approaches China; they are complementary and Japan needs raw material supplies and markets on which to sell its products. In several European states, Euro-communist parties are given a place in government but encounter serious problems in managing the economy, with the result that they are discredited; the initiative on the left wing is taken over by explicitly radical groups supported by intellectuals and students rather than workers. These often choose extra-parliamentary methods for their struggle, as in Italy. Perhaps the extreme right and parties like the populist Progress Party in Denmark can spring up in other states where an authoritarian and conservative tendency makes itself felt. Heightened conflicts can be expected between natives and immigrant groups, and separatism is predicted in places like Brittany, Corsica, and the Basque Country.

In an alternative scenario model, which he himself describes as “decidedly speculative”, Johansson sees how people turn their back on modernity. Decentralization becomes a watchword for a development of society whereby people seek a life in harmony with nature. Local organization, small units, local self-government: the old states become like federations, associations of local communities. Workers gain influence over companies in the industrialized world. Production is adapted to people’s needs, professional skill is rewarded, alienation decreases. Production becomes more environment-friendly, less wasteful. We in the West will become self-sufficient and not consume the food resources of developing countries. There is a switch to small-scale technology which does not require highly trained specialists; an example cited is the small-scale use of biogas. A new lifestyle emerges, characterized by solidarity and increased equality between the sexes. Societies in the West become socialist in one sense, in that the means of production are owned jointly; in another sense there is a departure from the socialist tradition which in the East entailed centralization, large-scale production, and elite rule. Do new ideologies actually arise in the wake of this transformation of society, perhaps “communalism” or “ecopolitical socialism”?

Sweden will become deeply involved in cooperation on disarmament and environmental protection. The country has built up substantial trust in many
developing countries and this can be retained, allowing us to play a mediating role in negotiations between developing and developed countries. An economic trend towards trade barriers and increased self-sufficiency within states can cause problems for Sweden with its dependence on exports. Johansson specifically points out industries such as steel, shipbuilding, textiles, paper, and auto manufacture. The risk is that the GDP will decline and that large groups of people will see their living standards fall. The state will acquire greater influence over industry. “Only the state has the resources to lead the necessary restructuring.”

Collective wage-earners’ investment funds will be established; changed ownership in business and industry can be expected. Nationalism will increase in Sweden and lead to heightened conflicts between immigrant groups and native Swedes. Right-wing extremists with more or less fascist elements and anarchists from the extreme left may attack society.

**Heretics among historians**

Looking back, Birgitta Odén has testified to the reactions provoked by the work done by herself, Sven Tägil, and other futurologists. They felt like heretics, passed over in silence; their reports and findings were discussed in the press and in social science journals, but hardly at all among historians. Fellow historians did not want to get closer to the social sciences. The fondness of historians for source criticism and atheoretical stances, according to Odén, meant that most historians thought that “forecasts were impossible and that future studies based on historical experience were meaningless.”

Futurology meant that the academic expertise and knowledge accumulated within the university could be packaged in a way that facilitated interaction with the surrounding society. It was a multidisciplinary activity that made it easier for Lund’s humanists and social scientists to contribute to a problem field that attracted considerable interest, for a time, in the public debate. It was also an experiment in cooperation and renewal within the university through an exchange of ideas across subject boundaries. But was it a successful experiment? If we count newspapers cuttings we would have to say that it was, likewise if we count the number of interactions between academics in Lund and politicians in the seat of government.

One can also discuss it in terms of a renewal of history as an academic subject. Futurology is an example of how certain actors in a university try to change their discipline by bringing in questions that are considered relevant and are in demand in research policy. The changes can concern the intellectual content of a university...
subject and its research questions, as well as its relations with the surrounding society. And a perhaps more banal but nevertheless important criterion concerns resources. University-based research and education, even in the 1970s, had to think in terms of resources, and futurology brought substantial project funding to Lund University in general and the Department of History in particular. As regards teaching, the Lund historians’ applied version of historical research also had a part to play. Students were attracted, for instance, by courses and seminars in empirical conflict studies. Advanced students who might otherwise have been lost to subjects such as sociology could be enticed to stay, so that seminar rooms were not depopulated.699 It can be argued that this vein of societal relevance in the choice of research topics has lived on among historians in Lund even though futurology has been abandoned; fields such as empirical conflict studies and the use of history, for instance, have been active for many years.

For a university which claims that it is prepared for both, it must surely be said that the experiment was successful, although the people involved sometimes felt like heretics when they went beyond the pale that is the present and gazed into the future.
Nu är bedömningen av LU:s forskning
ucydides, Th
LUM
Agar (2008).
2012
2012
2016
2006
2007
2011

Future research, future studies, futurology: the field has gone under different names, and sometimes the choice of term has reflected an epistemological positioning. The designation used here will mostly be futurology. Thomas (2015).

Ghamari-Tabrizi (2000);
Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005).
Light (2003); Andersson (2012).
Tägil’s interest in the role of technology in societal development continued subsequently in his work to create a department at Linköping University geared to the study of technology and social change, where he became a member of the board.


Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier (1975), p. 3.


Huldt (1978), p. 79.


Huldt (1987); Odén (2000).

Odén (1968), pp. 184 f.

Odén (1968), p. 185.

Odén (1968), p. 189.

Odén (1968), p. 190.


Odén (1972), p. 11.

Odén (1972), p. 93.


Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier (1975), pp. 24 f. The remaining two million kronor was intended for long-term basic research planned in close conjunction with the work of the research councils.


Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier (1975), p. 27.

Sekretariatet för framtidsstudier (1975), p. 3.


Interview with Sven Tägil, 5 June 2015.


Interview with Sven Tägil, 5 June 2015. Tägil’s interest in the role of technology in societal development continued subsequently in his work to create a department at Linköping University geared to the study of technology and social change, where he became a member of the board.


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Forsberg, “Till samtliga donatorer”, letter from John-Gunnar Forsberg, Lund, 1 June 1995, Anatomiska institutionens arkiv, Kroppsdonationshandlingar, F 5:10, ACS.


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Rosén (1968), p. 36.

Rosén (1968), p. 175.

Westling (2003), p. 16.

Rosén (1968), p. 82.

Fürst (1908), p. 471.

On anatomical dissection as a public event in Sweden see Fredbärj (1958), pp. 1–22.

The anatomical theatre in Padua from 1594 can still be visited today, as can the
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Abbreviations used in the references and notes:

AB, Aftonbladet
DN, Dagens Nyheter
HD, Helsingsborgs Dagblad
KvP, Kvällsposten
LUM, Lunds universitets magasin
Nutek, Närings- och teknikutvecklingsverket
SDS, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten
SFS, Svensk författningssamling
Sister, Swedish Institute for Studies in Education and Research
SOU, Statens officiella utredningar
SvD, Svenska Dagbladet
Vinnova, Verket för innovationssystem

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